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NATURAL RESOURCE PRICING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Vaman Rao
University of Missouri - Rolla
Rolla, Missouri

Abstract
In a competitive equilibrium the price of a natural resource will be
increasing at a rate equal to the social time preference rate, but in a
monopoly market, the price will be increasing at less than social time
preference rate. If the producer countries utilise their monopoly of
production and sale of a natural resource for the purpose of developing
their economies, the price of the natural resource will be growing at the
rate at which the producer countries' economies are growing, whether or
not the sales proceeds are used to finance their investment programmes,
fully or partly.
I,

Introduction

Section II presents a simple model of a
non-renewable natural resource being
traded in a competitive market and dis
cusses the conditions that affect the
price-behavior. Section III presents a
monopoly market situation and analyses
how the changed market situation affects
the prices. Section IV raises the problem
of unequal geographical distribution of
natural resources and discusses the issues
implied in this discrepancy between pro
duction and consumption among nations. It
analyses further what happens to the price
behavior when the investment funds for the
accelerated development of producer country
come, fully or partly, from the sale pro
ceeds of the natural resource . Section V
summarizes the results.

The problem of analyzing the price-behavior
of a non-renewable natural resource has,
of late, attracted considerable attention.
The quadrupling of petroleum prices has
prompted the persistent question whether
the countries having large and nearly
exclusive reserves of a natural resource,
can fix the price and limit the supply of
their product at will. Since the petroleum
exercise has apparently achieved consid
erable success from the producers' point
of view, there seem to be some efforts in
motion to create institutional structures
aimed at achieving similar successes in
other areas. The problem, however, is not
a new one. It was analyzed from a conser
vationist point of view by Hotelling (1931).
Scott (1965) discussed the problem of out
put regulation of a natural resource when
shifts over time occurred in costs and
prices, due to changes in technological
and demand conditions . Gordon (1967)
emphasized the influence of market condi
tions in the future on current output
decisions. Little study, however, has
been made of how the prices and quantities
to be supplied are determined in a market
which is nowhere near being perfectly
competitive and in which the producers
have the avowed aim of developing their
national economies at a faster rate of
growth.

II.

The Simple Model

We start with a simple model of a resource
which is non-renewable. The producer has
complete knowledge of the total stock of
the resource that could be extracted at '
zero costs almost fully and once it is
extracted, it cannot ever be replaced.
Let the total quantity of known and ex
tractable resource be q and let
be the
quantity produced in period t such that
00

tlQ qt < q

(1)

Assume perfectly competitive market condi
tions, with a risk-free interest rate r,
which could be used as a proxy for the
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social time preference rate. Let the
period-wise demand function for that
particular natural resource be given by
P t - dt

(,t >

The two values represent the p intercept
of the long-run demand function and the
point of intersection of the demand
function and the long-run perfectly
inelastic supply function. If the demand
function doesn't ever intersect the price
axis, then the total stock of the natural
resource will never be fully exhausted
and the price will remain undetermined.
The initial price could be zero when
the total known reserves are large enough
for the demand function to intersect the
quantity axis and thus become a free good.

(2)

In these conditions the optimum course for
the producers would be to maximise the
present value of the discounted sum of the
total revenue (= total profits) which is
given by the quantity
p .V. =

£

(l+rjt dt (qt) qt

(3)

III.

Subject to the supply constraint (1).
Associated with the optimum solution
would be an output stream given by the
sequence {gt}. Setting a Lagrangean and
differentiating it with respect to gt,
we get the solution
dt(qt) = A (l+r)t (t = 0,1,2,...)

The optimum course for a monopolist is to
maximise the discounted sum of the total
revenue stream (3) subject to the con
straint (1) . Associated with this maximum
value for the monopolist would be an out
put stream represented by the sequence of
quantities {q}. The Lagrangean that is
set up, when differentiated with respect
to q£, now gives a different solution,
which is

(4)

The value of \, the shadow price of the
natural resource, can be obtained by
substituting t=0, in (4), which would be
equal to dQ (q0) = pQ , so that (4) can be
written as

dt ( qt ) + dt ( qt ) q t = X ( l + r ) t ( t = 0 , 1 , 2 , . . ) (7)

dt(qt) = d0 (qQ) (l+r)t (t = 0,1,2,.) (5)

Noting that the LHS of (7) is the marginal
revenue in period t and by obtaining the
value of \ by substituting t = 0, (7) can
be written as

This shows that in a perfectly competitive
market the price of the natural resource
will be increasing at the rate r.

mt « mQ (l+r)t

Given the demand function, the constraint
condition (1) and the assumption t=T, the
period in which the resource is completely
exhausted, the initial and the maximum
prices, dQ (qQ) and dT (qT), can be easily
obtained.

(8)

Where
is the marginal revenue in period
t. This solution indicates the price
behavior modification in a monopoly market
relative to a competitive market. It is
not the price, but the marginal revenue
that increases at the rate r. Since for
any given positive quantity marginal
revenue is smaller than price, the price
will increase at a rate less than r.

Let the demand be represented by the
linear function
gt = a - Bpt

The Monopoly Behavior

(6)

For the demand function (6)

At t=T, since q will be completely ex
hausted, qT = 0. So pT = a/3, will be
the maximum price that could be obtained
in a competitive market.

the marginal revenue is given by

Using (1) and (5), (6) can be summed up
and written as

a - 2g t

and the price

lqt = g = Ea - &ZpQ (l+r)T

P, = < 5 + mt) / 2

which gives the solution
not - q
do 1(q )
0rJ
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under the constraint (1) .

The maximum price that the monopolist
could charge would be equal to the priceintercept of the demand function (i.e.
a/$ and the minimum initial price would
be the same as in the competitive condi
tions, unless the known reserves are large
enough as not to effect the supply con
straint (1). When the marginal revenue
is zero, the monopolist will still be
charging ^ . 2 as the price.
2

IV.

Associated with this maximisa tion
would be a sequence of quanti ties
which they will be selling in the
The relevant Lagrangean will give
following solution.
pt = A d + g ) t (t =

p

The geographical distribution of natural
resources, viewed at the present time,
has given rise to a peculiar problem.
At least in respect of some important
natural resources, the consuming countries
are endowed with little or no known
reserves, while the producing countries,
which have the most reserves, (and which
are 'poor' otherwise), find that their
reserves of natural resources are a sure
source of investment funds, so badly
needed to transform their economies.
Realizing that the present prices are too
low, they feel that they should price
their product in such a way that they get
the maximum amounts of investment funds,
without having to exhaust the stock of
the reserve too rapidly. This feeling
stems from the thought that once they
exhaust their known reserves they would
be left with no source to fall back upon,
and that their economies will continue to
remain backward.

,1 ,2 , --- )

Let us relax the assumption that all the
inve stment fun ds are acquired through
the sale of the na tura 1 resource. If
they form on 1y a P art of the total
requ irements / the othe r part coming
from the domes tic savi ngs, then the
quan tit y to be maximis ed could be expres sed as
(U)
1 <Pt qt - svPtqt} (l+g)~t
Where s i s the savings propens ity and V
is the con stant output capital rati o .
Adj oini ng (11) and (1) and differen tia ting
the Lag ran gean with respect to qtr we ge t .

Let us assume a simple economy, growing
at a steady-state rate, g. Let the
investment funds required to sustain
this rate of growth in period t be pt gt ,
the total revenu e ob tained by the sale of
the natural reso urce , under the assump tion
tha t the sa 1e of the na tural resource output is the only sour ce of investment.
The quantity p t qt will be growing at
ra te g, as in a stea dy state

Pt (1- sv) -= X (1+g) t (t=o,1,2 , ...)

(1

or
X
t
Pt = — --(1 + g)t
1-sv
Since sv is likely to be much less than
unity, the initial price will be set at
a higher level. The annual increase will
however, take place at the same rate g.

(9)

It is obvious that the funds equalling
p^q will make the same contribution to
the process of growth in period t, as will
do p tqt (l+g)~'t: in the initial period,
Ther efore, the producer countries will
adop t an optimum course when they maximise
the quantity
l P tqt (1+9) - 1
t-0

{gtK

market
the

Where X could be interpreted as the shadow
cost of development per unit of natural
resource. The price, therefore, will be
growing at the rate g. But by (4), we
know that in competitive conditions d^fg^)
grows at the rate r. If g = r, then both
the quantities will be the same. In the
event g > r , pfc > dt (qt) and if p < dt(9t)
when g<r, an unlikely event. Similarly
modified relationship we would observe in
the behavior of marginal revenue in a
monopoly market situation, where the price
of the natural resource will be increasing
at a rate less than g. Cartelization
of oil trade could indeed be better for
consuming countries.

Less Developed Countries and
the natural resources

t
Pt qt = p o qo (1 +9)

0

course

V.

Summary and Conclusions

In a competitive equilibrium the price
of a natural resource will be increasing
at a rate equal to the social time
preference rate, r. In a monopoly
situation the rise in prices will be

(1 0 )
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